Abstract. We rst show that a Feistel type block cipher is broken if the round function is approximated by a low degree vectorial Boolean function. The proposed attack is a generalization of the higher order di erential attack to a probabilistic one. We next introduce a notion of higher order bent functions in order to prevent our attack. We then show their explicit constructions.
Introduction
Consider a Feistel type block cipher with a round function G K such that (y 1 ; : : : ; y n ) = G K (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) (1) where K denotes a key. Then G K can be viewed as a polynomial on GF(2 n ) or a set of Boolean functions ff 1 ; : : : ; f n g such that y i = f i (x 1 ; : : : ; x n ) for i = 1; : : : ; n :
From a view point of polynomials, Jakobsen and Knudsen showed the interpolation attack which is e ective if the degree of G K is small 4]. Jakobsen further showed that the block cipher is broken even if G K is approximated by a low degree polynomial 3].
On the other hand, from a view point of Boolean functions, Jakobsen and Knudsen showed the higher order di erential attack 4]. It is e ective if each of the degree of f i is small, where the degree is de ned as the degree of a Boolean function.
In this paper, we rst show that the block cipher is broken even if each f i is approximated by a low degree Boolean function. We call this attack a probabilistic higher order di erential attack because our attack is a generalization of the higher order di erential attack to a probabilistic one. (It can also be considered as a generalization of the di erential attack 1] to a higher order one.)
We next introduce a notion of higher order bent functions in order to prevent our attack. Intuitively, an r-th order bent function is a Boolean function f such that N (r) f is the maximum, where N (r) f is de ned as a distance from f to the set of Boolean functions with degree at most r. This means that an r-th order bent function is not approximated by any Boolean function with degree at most r if r is small.
We then present some explicit constructions of r-th order bent functions such that other cryptographic criteria are satis ed as well. This paper is organized as follows. In Section 3, we review related works. In Section 4, we propose the probabilistic higher order di erential attack. In 
Proposed Attack
In this section, we show that a Feistel type block cipher is broken even if the round function G is approximated by a low degree vectorial Boolean function.
We call this attack the probabilistic higher order di erential attack because our attack is a generalization of the higher order di erential attack to a probabilistic one.
Algorithm of Our Attack
In a Feistel type block cipher with block size 2n, let x R be kept constant. Theñ Step 1: Choose x R 2 GF(2) n randomly. Choose w 2 GF(2) n and a full rank (r + 1) n matrix L over GF(2) randomly.
Step 2: For all a 2 GF(2) r+1 , compute the ciphertext y(a) = (y L (a); y R (a)) of a plaintext (aL w; x R ).
Step Step 1: Let T i = 0 for 1 i jK m j.
Step 2: For j = 1; : : : ; N, do:
Step 3: Output k c such that T c is the maximum. u t Our experiment shows that if N = dp ?2 e, then the success probability is larger than 90 %.
Example
We show a block cipher such that it is broken by the proposed attack, but not broken by the higher order di erential attack. 
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Higher Order Bent Function
In this section, we introduce a notion of higher order bent functions in order to prevent our attack. We then present their explicit constructions which satisfy some other cryptographic criteria as well.
Higher Order Nonlinearity
The truth table of a Boolean function f(x) is de ned as (f ( 0 ) for 0 r n. We say that N (r) f is the r-th order nonlinearity of f(x).
Note that the well known nonlinearity of f(x) is equivalent to N (1) f .
We next show that N (r) f is closely related to the covering radius of the r-th Proof.
u t By using Lemma 5.12, we can prove the following theorems. The proofs will be given in the nal paper. 
